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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the association between related parties’ transactions and 
earnings management in Indonesia. Firm's executives officers accompanied by board of 
director members usually engage in related parties’ transactions to expropriate the firm’s 
resources. Therefore, they have incentives to manage earnings either to increase their 
perquisites or possibly to mask such expropriation.  
This study presents evidence that earnings management is positively associated with 
certain types of related parties’ transactions. Overall, this study concludes that concerns 
about related parties’ transactions as a factor associated with earnings management are 
warranted, especially for certain related parties’ transactions. There are purchase costs 
from subsidiary or parent companies and expenses incurred from the firm’s related 
parties’ transactions. 
Keywords: related parties’ transactions, perquisite, earnings management 
 
                                                 
1  We appreciate the helpful comments from I Made Narsa 
and Damai Nasution (Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya), 
Ratna Chandrasari (Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta), Sri 
Suryaningsum (Universitas Pembangunan Nasional, 
Yogyakarta). We are also grateful for financial support 
from the Center for Good Corporate Governance, 
Faculty of Economics & Business, Universitas Gadjah 
Mada. #This paper has been presented in The 9th Asian 
Academic Accounting Association in Kadir Has 
University, Istanbul, Turkey.  
